It started with a question: what if a meaningful share of fraudsters appearing in one bank's data were also appearing in another's?
InsightHypothesis: if fraudsters appearing in one bank's data also appeared in another's, the value proposition for sharing intelligence changes entirely.
I taught myself enough Python to run cross-tenant queries against live data across four banks, and found that 52% of fraudster profiles had crossover across institutions. That number became my internal stakeholder stat. It reframed the conversation from "maybe we should share intelligence" to "here is the scale of what we're currently missing."
Profiles Analysed250
Institutions4
Crossover Found52%
Impact52% of fraudster profiles had crossover across institutions. The intelligence was already there; it just needed to be connected.
Buy-in didn't come quickly. It took six months to get full alignment, because the compliance and legal implications were significant. The turning point was external: industry signals started pointing toward cross-institution information sharing becoming the expected direction. Because we'd already done the analysis and groundwork, we were positioned to move as soon as that window opened.
Alongside the data work, I scheduled calls with fraud investigators across banks to understand what intelligence they'd actually be willing to share, and where the legal and psychological boundaries sat. The key finding: investigators wanted to collaborate; confidence, not willingness, was the barrier. They didn't know what they could legally share.
InsightInvestigators wanted to collaborate. Confidence, not willingness, was the barrier: they didn't know what they could legally share.